

E. Dzelepi

THE TRUTH ABOUT CYPRUS

**Foreign Literature Publishing House
Moscow — 1958**

Э. ДЗЕЛЕПИ

Правда
о Кипре

Source: TRUTH ABOUT CYPRUS by E. DZELEPI,

Brussels, 1958

Translation from French: Yu. BARSEGOVA

Editor: A. SHULGOVSKII, Candidate of Historical Sciences

Language: Russian

***Scanned and transcribed into English and prepared as
E-Book.***

August2021

<p><i>The Socialist Truth in Cyprus — London Bureaux</i></p> <p>http://www.st-cyprus.co.uk</p> <p></p>	<p><i>Direct Democracy (Communist Party)</i></p> <p>www.directdemocracy4u.uk</p> <p></p>
---	--

E. DZELEPI

TRUTH ABOUT CYPRUS

Brussels, 1958

Translation from French

Yu. BARSEGOVA

Editor

Candidate of Historical Sciences

A. SHULGOVSKII

FOREIGN LITERATURE PUBLISHING HOUSE

Moscow — 1958

CONTENTS

FROM THE PUBLISHER.....	7
I.....	8
“BATTLE FOR CYPRUS”	10
II.....	13
“DIVIDE AND RULE”	14
SCARE OPERATION	16
“PLAYING WITH FIRE”	17
III.....	21
TRAP	22
TURKISH PARTNER.....	23
SUCCESSFUL MANEUVER	26
IV.....	28
FROM LONDON TO CONSTANTINOPLE	29
LOOK FOR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ..,	32
RECOGNITION OF INTENTION	33
V.....	36
ENGLISH IN OWN NETWORKS	37
“CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION” MADE IN ENGLAND	39
TURKISH OBSTACLE	40
VI.....	44
A FARCE WITH “NEW PROPOSALS”	44
“OFFERS” —ULTIMATUM	46
DRAMA MAKARIOS.....	48

A HOPEFUL ATTEMPT	49
VII.....	52
CHALLENGE WITH “CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION”	54
NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT POSSIBLE	55
VIII.....	57
“OBLIGATIONS” OF MR LENNOX-BOYD.....	57
THE LATEST FIND OF THE MINISTRY OF THE COLONY.....	59
BREAKING OFF NEGOTIATIONS	60
A STATEMENT OF ENGLISH HYPOCRISY	62
IX.....	64
EXPULSION OF MAKARIOS	65
CONFESSION	68
“NEW PRINCIPLES”	69
SUSPICIOUS DESIRE	72
X.....	75
THE HOPES OF THE BRITISH	76

FROM THE PUBLISHER

For a long time, the attention of the world community has been riveted on the dramatic events in Cyprus, whose population is selflessly fighting against the British colonial yoke, for the recognition of the right to self-determination.

The brochure of the French publicist Dzelepi, the author of a number of works on the problems of the modern international situation, is devoted to the events in Cyprus and is offered to the attention of the Soviet reader.

With his inherent skill, skillfully operating successfully with selected facts that are for the purpose, Dzelepi reveals the behind-the-scenes side of the policy of British imperialism in Cyprus, examining the Cyprus question against the background of the current international situation.

The book shows on irrefutable facts that crimes of British imperialism against the Cypriots are just one of the links in politics English ruling circles seeking to maintain his shaken colonial rule in the Near and Middle East. He writes with irony and sarcasm, the author of the British colonialists crucifying in the United Nations Organisation about its "respect" for the principles of freedom and democracy, but in fact cruelly cracking down on the liberation movement of the people of Cyprus. But the terror of the British colonialists only tenfolds the resistance of the Cypriots. The ground burns under the feet of the invaders. The British ruling circles also failed in their attempts to remove the Cyprus issue from the UN agenda.

The entire world democratic community supports the just demands of the Cypriots.

Written with great sympathy for the liberation struggle of the people of Cyprus, Dzelepi's brochure deserves the attention of the Soviet reader.

*Cyprus is the dishonour of the
English Conservatives.
Manchester Guardian,
May 15, 1956.*

I.

Cyprus is the greatest political scandal of our era. This island, which belongs to Europe, is a British colony, and its population, subject to a state—a member of the United Nations, is deprived of the right to self-determination.

For a long time, the Greek government, preoccupied with the desire not to harm the “traditional friendship” between Greece and England, voluntarily refrained from raising the “Cyprus question” at the UN.

It hoped that the British Government, driven by the same sentiment, would also be disposed to negotiate directly with Greece in order to find a fair solution to this issue. But as a result of England’s stubborn refusal of any negotiations on the Cyprus question, the position of the Greek government finally became completely unbearable.

This reluctance to negotiate was all the more unjustified since the British themselves recognised the right of the Cypriots to join Greece and their repeated promises they made to the Cypriots and Greece showed that they do not attach much importance to Cyprus and could painlessly sacrifice it.

In 1907, Assistant Secretary of State for the Colonies Winston Churchill declared in the House of Commons:

“It is not surprising that the Cypriots, being of Greek descent, strive for unification—by what might be called their mother-homeland; they strive towards this goal with all zeal and perseverance. Such feeling is an example of reverent devotion homeland, so characteristic of the noble Greek people.”

On October 17, 1915, the British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Gray, on behalf of His Majesty’s government, promised to transfer Cyprus to Greece if the Greek government “immediately” entered the war.

It goes without saying that the essence of the matter does not change from the fact that Greece took part in the war on the side of the Allies only two years later, and therefore the promise was not fulfilled.

On May 13, 1919, in the Council of Four, which worked out the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty, Lloyd George declared: “I intend to give Greece also the island of Cyprus”.

To Wilson’s remark that if the British Prime Minister can make such a “gift” to Greece, it will be a “big deal,” Lloyd George replied:

“It would remove greedy yearnings and lusts, the consequences of which should be feared. As for Turk, I do not feel remorse: they have no rights to a country that has been turned into a desert”¹.

A few months later, on November 14, 1919, Lloyd George wrote to the Archbishop of Cyprus:

“The rights of the people of Cyprus, their desire to join Greece will be well taken into account by the

¹ Les Délibérations du conseil des quatre, Notes de l’officier interprété Paul Mantoux, Deux vol., éditions du Center national de la recherche scientifique, 1955.

[English] government when the matter will be put up for discussion.”

“BATTLE FOR CYPRUS”

Under these circumstances, the Greek government was forced to raise the issue of Cyprus in the United Nations. On August 20, 1954, the Greek government for the first time demanded that the question of Cyprus be included in the agenda of the General Assembly, which was supposed to take place on September 21.

So through the fault of England between her and Greece, the “battle for Cyprus” was “officially” started. On the same day, the British delegate to the UN, Sir Pearson Dixon, in the most categorical form expressed his protest against meeting the demands of the Greek government. He regretted this government action Greece, declaring that it thereby harms the old friendship between England and Greece, trying to take possession of what belongs to Britain, “because Britain” bought Cyprus from Turkey.

From this argument it smacks of a slaveholding dunk, but even if one recognises any significance behind it, then the island should be returned to the Cypriots, because England “bought” Cyprus from Turkey precisely on their money¹.

¹ According to a convention concluded on June 4, 1878 between the English government and the Sublime Port, the Sultan agreed to “set aside the island of Cyprus for its occupation and administration” by England, which was obliged to pay the Sultan £ 99,799 annually.

England withdrew this amount from the meagre budget of the island (150 thousand pounds sterling). Moreover! This amount was not paid into the Treasury of the Turkish Sultan: it was offset

The outcome of the “battle” seemed to tilt in Greece’s favour when on 23 September the General Committee of the General Assembly, disregarding British objections, voted nine votes against three for a comprehensive discussion of the Greek claims against Cyprus.

However, this first success of Greece was left without consequences. Two draft resolutions were submitted to the Political Committee of the General Assembly: one proposed by the Greek delegation stated that the General Assembly expresses the wish that the principle of self-determination be applied to Cyprus; another draft was introduced by the New Zealand delegation, but its inspiration was the British. The New Zealand resolution invited the Assembly to postpone the debate.

On December 14, 1954, the Political Committee, by twenty-eight votes to fifteen, with sixteen abstentions (the figures themselves indicated the efforts made behind the scenes to achieve the desired result of the vote), approved the New Zealand resolution. Of the great powers, only the Soviet Union voted for the Greek draft resolution.

The next day, the Political Committee reaffirmed the decision taken the day before, approving by forty-nine votes in favour, with eleven abstentions, to discontinue discussions on the Cyprus issue. Under the pretext of seeking to avoid a debate that “could damage good relations between several United Nations

against the interest on the British loan to Turkey. Therefore, “purchase” Cyprus not only was not associated with any costs, but, on the contrary, for many decades brought England about 10 thousand pounds annually.

Member States” (that was the main argument), the United Nations refused to recognise the Cypriot population’s right to self-determination. In reality, the decision was made as a result of joint pressure from the United States, England and France. England won the first stage of the “Battle of Cyprus” at the UN. British colonialism triumphed by using the idea of preserving the “unity” of the United Nations.

II.

One might have thought that after this inglorious victory the British Government would find itself satisfied and that on the Cyprus question it would henceforth be guided by the spirit of the New Zealand, or rather its own, resolution, which it was able to achieve in the General Assembly. Indeed, the postponement of the discussion of the question raised would make sense, in accordance with the spirit of the New Zealand resolution, only if the British Government showed a willingness to enter into direct negotiations with the Greek Government. During the debates that unfolded on December 14 in the Political Committee, the delegations of Syria and Iraq recommended that the British and Greek governments seek a solution to the issue through direct negotiations.

However, the British government interpreted the results of the debate in its own way. Far from intending to rest on its laurels, it learned only that the United Nations, by its first vote (in the General Assembly committee), nevertheless recognised the existence of the “Cyprus question” and that it was within their competence to consider it. That was enough to sound the alarm. Moreover, the postponement of the debate also implied the eventual possibility of their resumption.

Thus, in reality, the “battle for Cyprus” continued. To put an end to this once and for all, England resorted to action on a large scale, not only with the aim of depriving the United Nations of the right to consider the Cyprus question, but also in order to make impossible

any negotiations between England and Greece and, therefore, any solution to this issue. ...

“DIVIDE AND RULE”

To this end, the British decided to use Turkey, which they had already drawn into the Cyprus conflict even before the discussion of this issue at the United Nations began. Turkey's participation in this conflict, as surprising as it was unexpected, at the same time revealed the whole meaning of the British manoeuvre. Turkey had nothing to do with Cyprus. She could not make any valid claims against Cyprus. In accordance with the terms of the Lausanne Greek-Turkish Agreement (1923), she finally renounced all rights to Cyprus related to the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1878, according to which the island was transferred under the control of England. The Turkish government did not care about the public opinion of this country.

Turkey's unexpected interest in the fate of Cyprus revealed the role that England assigned to the government of Ankara, whose game immediately became completely clear: *to complicate the issue of Cyprus to the limit in order to make any decision impossible*. Turkey was very suitable for this role, not only because there was a Turkish national minority in Cyprus, but also because it was an ally of Greece in the Balkan Pact; on the other hand, it was connected with England by the Baghdad Pact and, therefore, was ready to take an active part in the game conceived by the British.

In Turkey, the leadership of the Cyprus annexation movement was carried out mainly by the Cyprus

National Defence Committee, a newly created organisation that enjoyed the open support of the official authorities. As if by coincidence, at the very moment when the UN was preparing to discuss the Cyprus issue, this committee *for the first time in Turkey* launched a campaign against the annexation of Cyprus to Greece.

The British used the Turkish minority for their own purposes, even on the island itself. The British authorities in Cyprus have always preferred the Turks. Previously, they systematically facilitated the emigration of the Greeks, doing everything possible to expand the Turkish minority and strengthen its position on the island. Now it was a question of setting the Turks against the Greeks.

On the island itself there was an organisation similar to the Cyprus National Defence Committee, mentioned above. This organisation, created, like the first, most recently with the approval and direct support of the British authorities of the island, was called “*Kıbrıs Türktür*”, that is, “*Cyprus is Turk*”¹. It made people talk about themselves for the first time in connection with the planned discussion of the Cyprus issue at the UN General Assembly.

The aims of this campaign were so clear, and its real inspirers so well known, that the whole manoeuvre was already revealed in correspondence to the Athenian press from London. It was about the long-standing policy of *turning the Cyprus issue into a Greek-Turkish conflict*. This would allow England to act as an arbiter in

¹ It is interesting to note that the Turks who dispute the Greek character of Cyprus themselves use the Greek name for the island.

the dispute between its two allies and would give the British government complete freedom of action, paralyzing the actions of the Greek government at the same time².

SCARE OPERATION

But it was the very nature of this fierce campaign against the annexation of Cyprus to Greece that made clear all its artificiality and aroused suspicion. Indeed, she was completely unjustified and clearly did not correspond to the declared goals. Firstly, Cyprus was not in the hands of the Turks, but in the hands of the British, and Turkey could not feel fears that England would abandon the island. Secondly, Turkey did not raise the issue of joining Cyprus and was satisfied that the British remained there.

The Turks could oppose the annexation of Cyprus to Greece only for security reasons. But after all, Greece was its ally, and in the “Atlantic” unity of Ankara and Athens they even saw the “Greek-Turkish federation “! To at least somehow justify references to security interests that could justify a fierce campaign, the Turks referred to the age-old “communist threat”—an argument suitable for all occasions, helping in all unseemly deeds.

However, in essence, this entire campaign bore an irreconcilable, pronounced anti-Hellenic character, which even more betrayed its true goal. Under the pretext that Greece’s claims to Cyprus allegedly testify

² Vima (Athenian government body}, 8 September 1954.

to the revival of the *megalomaniac idea* of returning the Greeks to Constantinople, the most prominent commentators of the Turkish press drew from the arsenal of Turkish nationalism old claims that seemed to be forever buried under the magnificent monument of “Greek-Turkish friendship”, in particular, claims to Eastern Thrace belonging to Greece and to the Greek islands of Samos, Chios, Mytilene, Rhodes and others adjacent to the shores of Asia Minor.

Apparently it was an *intimidation operation*. It was carried out by Turkey, and it was all the more strange because the latter could not derive any benefit from this, since the only consideration that could justify these actions—the “threat” of the annexation of Cyprus to Greece—was completely ruled out.

The only people who benefited from the “Turkish threat” that arose at the prospect of resolving the Cyprus issue in favour of the Cypriots and is already clearly emerging were the British. The Greeks should have thought about it. The “Cyprus question” was fraught with much more serious consequences than they thought: it could involve them in a war with Turkey.

“PLAYING WITH FIRE”

Intimidation policies can only be effective if threats are steadily escalating. By resorting to this policy, it is impossible to foresee where it will lead. This was the case with London’s intimidation policy on the Cyprus issue.

The Greek side, however, regarded its defeat at the UN as a postponed party.

“Greece,” said Marshal Papagos, Chairman of the Council of Ministers on December 19, 1954, “will continue to fight for the Cypriots’ right to self-determination. We will raise this issue again at the UN at the next session of the General Assembly and with great chances of success.”

On the other hand, in Cyprus itself, the enosis movement (accession to Greece) gained such scope and strength that London finally realised how cruelly they were mistaken, thinking that the population of the island in its overwhelming the majority will not follow the “agitators” and “ringleaders”. The British realized how wrong they were in thinking that the Cypriots could be won over by mere promises of “constitutional” reforms and that they would ultimately favour the “economic argument” of British propaganda that their island would become less prosperous if be part of Greece¹.

Finally, the British admitted that their own position was rather weak. It was vulnerable primarily in the United Nations, because the British argued that the strategic interests of their empire were more important than the principles underlying the UN Charter. Secondly, the main argument of the British, which consisted in the fact that the security of the Atlantic bloc states makes their presence on the island necessary Cyprus may also be used against the British themselves.

¹ The English press could not understand why the Cypriots insist on unification with Greece, thereby losing new opportunities, opening up to the economy of their islands in connection with the placement here is the headquarters of the British Middle Eastern command. But there are so many things that will remain incomprehensible to “Reasonable” and “reasonable” people!

And indeed, if the situation was as the British envisioned it, Cyprus would lose the importance that it could have been the last stronghold of the British Empire in the Eastern Mediterranean, and would have turned into one of the many bases that the North Atlantic Pact Organization has in this area all the way to the Caucasus. And in this case, Cyprus could move to Greece without any obstacles, remaining the British base within the framework of strategic plans NATO, especially since Greece itself is nothing more than an extensive American base. Thus, it is clear what this would lead to if, based on the British argument, the United States, for example, demanded for security reasons to extend their power to the countries in which they have bases.

However, the strategic argument put forward by the British about the need for their presence in Cyprus in the interests of NATO and in itself does not stand up to criticism, because, to keep the island under their rule, the British pitted Turkey against Greece, thereby destroying the Greek-Turkish alliance and the Balkan Pact, on which the entire NATO military system in the Eastern Mediterranean is based.

Under the circumstances, London believed that the only way out of this unfavourable situation for England was to carry out the intimidation operation in order to paralyze Greece and take it out of the game.

Thus, during the discussion of the Cyprus issue at the UN in December 1954, the English delegate Nutting, again repeating that England did not intend to leave its colony, made a statement full of threats; "The Greeks," he said, "must stop *playing with fire*." "Playing with fire"... That was the whole point of the English manoeuvre. The "fire" that the Greeks played in

demanding Cyprus was not the threat of war with England. No, it was a threat of war that could break out from Turkey.

The next phase of the intimidation policy was already quite clear-cut.

III.

The English thesis, as we have seen, boiled down to the fact that the question of Cyprus does not concern Greece, since the island is a colony of the crown. And nevertheless, the British government suddenly announced its readiness to discuss the Cyprus issue not only with Greece, but also with Turkey. On June 30, 1955, Sir Anthony Eden announced in the House of Commons that he had invited the Greek and Turkish governments to meet in London to discuss “political and military matters concerning the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus.”

This step caused a sensation. In London, they have already congratulated themselves on the fact that Sir Anthony Eden was able to find a way out of the impasse he himself created by abandoning the completely irreconcilable position that he adhered to on the question of Cyprus. The fact that England agreed to discuss the fate of the Crown Colony with two foreign powers was seen as a great concession on her part and proof that she intended to resolve the Cyprus issue. They also said that this testifies to Britain’s recognition of the existence of the “Cyprus question” and allegedly is a “sharp turn” and even a “retreat” from her policy. At the same time, government circles in London assured that Greece had won a “real diplomatic victory.” It has even been argued that “English philhellenism” remains “a living reality...”¹

Meanwhile, the conference proposed by the British had nothing to do with the bilateral Anglo-Greek

¹ Figaro, July 2, 1955.

negotiations sought by the Government of Athens. The very fact of inviting Turkey made it obvious the true intentions of the British, which prompted them to take this initiative. However, the Greek government was inclined to see in the proposed meeting only the possibility of holding direct negotiations with England on the Cyprus issue. As for Turkey's participation in this discussion, the Greek government has made a clear a miscalculation, without giving it much importance. In addition, it could not oppose Turkey's participation in the negotiations for fear of jeopardizing its relations with the "Turkish ally".

This was precisely the cunning of the British. On the one hand, they used the desire of the Greek government to negotiate directly with them on the Cyprus issue, and on the other, they used the very delicate position in which Greece was in relation to Turkey, in order to lure the government of Athens into the trap of a tripartite conference. Indeed, it was a trap.

TRAP

In reality, the British were infinitely far from seeking a solution to the Cyprus question.

The very next day after Sir Anthony Eden announced his project for a trilateral meeting, the government agency Daily Telegraph wrote bluntly that the negotiations would be doomed to failure if Greece and Turkey¹ did not understand the fact that England ne intends to leave the base that she established in Cyprus.

¹ Camo it goes without saying that it was, in fact, only about Greece, since Turkey was involved in this parody of negotiations

The very formula of the conference agenda testified to this quite convincingly. The purpose of the conference was to discuss “political and military issues concerning the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus.” As you can see, Cyprus was mentioned as a side issue. But if it, as one might suppose, became the main issue of the negotiations, the presence of the Turks would make any agreement and decision-making impossible.

Indeed, if the bilateral Anglo-Greek negotiations had even the slightest chance of success, then he completely disappeared due to Turkey’s participation in the negotiations. The Ankara government, which hastened to accept the British invitation, made it clear that at the London conference for Turkey there could be no question of take part in any decision or undertake any obligation regarding settlement of the Cyprus issue.

TURKISH PARTNER

As a prelude to Turkey’s participation in the negotiations on the Cyprus issue, a campaign that was as bizarre as a showcase campaign over Cyprus was unleashed by the Turks with the obvious support of the British. Using false messages and provocations, they aimed to create the impression that there is a serious conflict between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority, which allegedly endangers the Turkish border of the island. It is important to note in this regard that never since the overthrow of the sultans’ power, the

precisely because it was against the British withdrawal from Cyprus.

Cypriot Turks had no reason to complain about the bad attitude of the Greeks towards them; both communities coexisted peacefully.

All this, of course, was sewn with white thread. But this whole crudely staged campaign made it possible to unravel the goals pursued by its inspirers: to present the case as if the Turkish minority in Cyprus was in danger as a result of the hostile actions of the Greeks, and thereby justify the interest shown by the Ankara government in the Cyprus issue; as for the British, it seemed as if they were out of the game.

Since then, the “threat looming over the Muslims” of Cyprus has become a favourite topic in Turkish circles. A few days after the announcement of the convening of an Anglo-Greek-Turkish conference in London in Ankara and Constantinople, a rumour was spread that the Greek Cypriots were preparing to massacre the Turks. They even named the date - August 28, the eve of the start of the trilateral conference. Most seriously, Ankara’s leaders were pretending to believe these rumours, although they certainly should have known their source. On August 23, that is, five days before the start of the London conference, the Turkish government made an official demarche before the British government, demanding from it “assurances” that the Muslim minority of Cyprus would be taken under protection.

In its note, the Turkish government also indicated that it cannot be indifferent to the activities of the “terrorists” who openly threaten to “exterminate the Turks living in Cyprus.”

True, two days later, President of the Republic of Turkey Bayar made the following statement to the press: “It is hardly possible that the Greek Cypriots

would threaten the Turks living on the island.” But on the same day, Turkish newspapers published an extensive statement made by Prime Minister Menderes at a press conference attended by members of the Turkish delegations to the trilateral conference in London. In his statement, the head of government expressed nothing more, nothing less than fears that “bloody events” may occur in Cyprus.

Referring to the note of the Turkish government, transmitted on August 23 to the British government, Menderes emphasised the “importance and seriousness” of this document, recalling also that in it the Turkish government had expressed the “concern” it felt in the face of the “threat” hanging over the Turks Cyprus.

The head of the Turkish government ended his speech with a barely veiled threat: Turkey will do everything in its power to prevent events from escalating into an adventure “which could be fatal for the Greek nation.” For never (and this was his last warning) Turkey will not agree to change the status quo of Cyprus if it would be contrary to its interests.

This statement shed light on the whole mechanism of the operation carried out in Turkey in close connection with the operation, which began in London with the convening of a trilateral conference on Cyprus. Everything was based on a false message able to stir the minds. Having made an official demarche on this matter, this version was given a believable character. And all this in order to present the case as if the Cyprus question had entered the most critical stage of its development and as if there was an immediate threat of war between Greece and Turkey, for the latter is full of determination to resist the annexation of Cyprus to Greece.

SUCCESSFUL MANEUVER

The English manoeuvre became clear from the very beginning of the opening of the trilateral conference on 29 August in London. Macmillan, England's foreign secretary, secured the presidency and acted as *arbiter* between Greece and Turkey, which thus became "interested parties." In the commentary of the English press it was emphasised that the contradictions between Greece and Turkey are irreconcilable and that England should intervene and use all her authority, in order to achieve a settlement of the issue and avoid serious complications in the Eastern Mediterranean. Throughout the conference, it was only about the "efforts" made by Macmillan to "reconcile" the Greeks and Turks, as if the British had no attitude to business!

Thus, the Cyprus issue was no longer only a matter of Anglo-Greek relations, but also affected *Greek-Turkish relations*. Therefore, it ceased to be a question concerning the relationship between the British and Cypriots. Turkey henceforth became a state openly interested in the fate of Cyprus; England lost the right to negotiate directly with the Cypriots. As we have seen, the Turks not only opposed the annexation of Cyprus to Greece, but were against changing the status quo of the withdrawal.

This was the most significant change in the situation. Until now, Greece could, in the absence of a truly acceptable solution to the Cyprus issue, at least hope to achieve some positive results through direct negotiations between England and the Cypriots. From now on, this possibility was also excluded, since the right to vote in this matter was granted to the Turks as well.

It goes without saying that the role of the British Foreign Minister in the role of arbiter did not lead to anything, since the “disputing parties”—the Greeks and Turks—were on irreconcilable positions. On September 7, the three participants in the London meeting dispersed, issuing a communiqué stating that the conference was “*interrupted*.”

This was to mean that the negotiations between the British, Greeks and Turks were not broken, which was exactly the intentions of the British, who put forward the idea of trilateral negotiations. To keep the doors open for the resumption of trilateral talks, Macmillan presented a new draft Cyprus constitution at the last minute to the conference.

The response from the Greek government, received in London on September 13, was predictably negative. The new draft constitution for Cyprus was mainly in the interest of British imperial politics, which Macmillan reiterated at the opening of the trilateral conference in London, announcing to the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey that Britain intended to remain in Cyprus as long as it was “responsible” for the position in the Near and Middle East.

Meanwhile, the English manoeuvre was a complete success at the United Nations. On September 23, 1955, the question of Cyprus was removed from the agenda of the General Assembly. Since from now on this issue was the subject of direct negotiations between the “interested powers”, the General Assembly easily refused to discuss it, especially since it could do this, citing a desire to contribute to the success of these negotiations.

IV.

It was argued that the British, after the failure of the Anglo-Greek-Turkish conference in London, realized that “a sharp deterioration in relations between Greece and Turkey” could negate “the real benefits received by Great Britain. from the Trilateral Conference on Cyprus”¹.

Indeed, from the English point of view, everything that the trilateral conference could give was used, including the very fact of its failure, for this was part of the intentions of its organizers. The British never counted on a “successful” conclusion of the conference and the achievement of an agreement between its three participants on the question of Cyprus. If they invited Turkey, it was solely in order to worsen the Greek-Turkish relations. In this regard, the failure of the conference meant a clear success for them. Cyprus has become a bone of contention between Greece and Turkey.

This metamorphosis of the Cyprus question meant the fulfillment of all the wishes of the British. From now on, England will not have to simply deny the right of an entire people to freedom, which complicated her position in relation to Greece, the people of Cyprus and the United Nations. Now she will refer to the interests of preserving peace, she will argue that Cyprus can become a cause of conflict between Greece and Turkey if the Greeks and Cypriots insist on their demands too much.

¹ Le Monde, September 9, 1955.

FROM LONDON TO CONSTANTINOPLE

The English game became especially clear in the light of the events that began in Constantinople and Smyrna at that time, when the tripartite conference was drawing to a close. The anti-Greek demonstrations that took place there on the night of September 6-7, 1955, represented a kind of continuation and addition to the Anglo-Greek-Turkish negotiations. Everything was organized in anticipation of the failure of this conference, which was to follow in the event of Greece's unwillingness to refuse to protect the interests of the people of Cyprus. These demonstrations were supposed to serve as a kind of decisive argument in the London negotiations: to testify to the existence of a threat of war between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus.

In this connection, it is interesting to read the statement of Senator Knowland, made by him on September 26, 1955 in Los Angeles, to a correspondent of an Athenian newspaper¹. In this statement, the Republican leader made it clear that the events in Constantinople were intended to convince world public opinion is that the Turkish people are categorically opposed to the annexation of Cyprus to Greece, and also that responsibility for these events falls primarily on England.

In any case, in order to understand the significance of the anti-Greek uprisings in Constantinople and Smyrna-the scale and horrors of which were systematically exaggerated and eventually drowned out

¹ Vima, September 27, 1955.

in the world press²—it is necessary to consider them from this angle.

According to the Turkish official version, it was a “provocation”, about the “intrigues” of the communists, aimed at weakening solidarity of countries belonging to the system NATO. On September 13, the Turkish National Assembly unanimously announced that the events in Constantinople were caused by the communists, although it did not openly condemn these events and did not consider it necessary to cite the facts.

A classic alibi! Although this argument is already worn out, it is still used to justify. However, it can be applied to this case with much less success than to any other. After all, the Turkish government, as the correspondent of the London Daily Mail noted, has always boasted that in Turkey, where the communist party is banned, there are no communists.

A small number of telegrams from Constantinople, published in the world press, were unanimous in this issue: the September 6 demonstrations were carefully prepared and organised. Crowds poured into the streets

² It is not difficult to imagine what kind of “indignation” and anger would have seized the “free world” if the horrors and barbarism witnessed by ancient Byzantium (the name of the city of Constantinople before it was renamed in honour of the Emperor Constantine.—**Approx. Transl.**), took place in one of the countries behind the “Iron Curtain” in relation to, for example, the Catholic minority or the Jews, the Crusaders of the “Western civilization” would readily put on armour to throw themselves into a mortal battle against the “barbarians” and “atheists”. Here is one more proof of the blatantly deceitful nature of “free information”, which from time to time becomes the subject of serious discussion at international conferences.

of the city, shouting the slogan: “Turkish Cyprus!”—and by sending threats to the Greeks. They ransacked and robbed their shops, invaded their homes and set fire to houses, destroyed churches, schools, public institutions (maternity hospitals, dispensaries, public kitchens, etc.), and desecrated their graves.

The crowd obeyed certain orders and acted in accordance with carefully prepared plan.

Since the capture of Constantinople by the Turks, there have been terrible beatings of the Greeks in Turkey. But these horrors took place in an atmosphere of enmity or an explosion of Muslim fanaticism. The mentioned campaign was prepared with cold calculation and was frankly anti-Greek in nature, it was directed against everything Greek population surviving in Turkey¹.

This time there was no massacre, although, given the wild excesses that marked the events of September 6, there should have been expect the worst. This already testifies to the fact that the case was not at all explained by the explosion of popular fanaticism. It was about an organized and calculated operation with predetermined goals. As the Times correspondent noted (September 9, 1955), the “demonstrators” were ordered

¹ According to a report by the Greek Chamber of Commerce of Constantinople, 862 Greek-owned shops located in the city's central quarters were completely destroyed; in addition, hundreds of other Greek shops, located in outlying districts and suburbs, were destroyed and devastated. Over 700 houses were destroyed, burned and damaged. Finally, were destroyed, almost all Orthodox churches were burned or plundered (there were about 80 of them, and some of them were genuine monuments of Byzantine art).

to destroy everything they could get their hands on, but not to encroach on the lives of the Greeks.

LOOK FOR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ..,

The Turkish government, which explained the events in Constantinople by the “intrigues of the Communists”, did not hesitate at the same time to assert that they were caused by the so-called “sabotage” against the Turkish consulate in Thessaloniki, which took place the day before, on the night of 5-6 September, when a bomb blast destroyed the neighbouring house where Mustafa Kemal was born. This thesis was “officially” made by the representative of Turkey Zafer on September 26 before the UN General Assembly in order to justify the Constantinople “incidents”.

This “sabotage” and the message about the destruction of Mustafa Kemal’s house were part of the overall plan of the operation. The Salonika “sabotage” was supposed to serve as a pretext and signal for performances in Constantinople and Smyrna.

The “sabotage” took place on September 5 shortly after midnight. The next day, when anti-Greek demonstrations were to take place, the radio stations of Constantinople and Ankara, reporting in their daytime broadcasts about “sabotage”, were already talking about the “destruction” of the house in which Kemal was born. And one Constantinople newspaper even published a photograph of the “destroyed” house!

In fact, the second part of this message was completely false, and the photo was fake. As for the “sabotage” itself, the investigation carried out by the Greek police showed that it was a gross staging. A

harmless “bomb” - just what was needed to knock out the glass from ‘several window frames - was planted by the consular gatekeeper, who was just a simple executor. The Greek police were also able to identify the Intelligence Service agent in Athens, who drew up the action plan, as well as his henchman, a student of Turkish nationality, who acted as a liaison between the British intelligence agent and the Turkish consulate in Thessaloniki.

That is why both the British and the Turks made so much effort to hush up the case. The trial of the accused, which the Greek authorities had already promised to hold in the very near future at the end of October 1955, was continuously postponed as a result of strong pressure exerted on the Greek government by the governments of London, Ankara and Washington. On December 21, in an official demarche to the Greek government, the Turkish ambassador to Athens expressed his government’s “concern” about the actions of the Greek justice authorities in the case of the Thessaloniki “sabotage”.

Commenting on this demarche, Ankara’s official agency threatened Greece with even the use of reprisals; The Turkish press, for its part, launched a fierce campaign against Greece, accusing it of endangering “Greek-Turkish friendship” and world peace!

RECOGNITION OF INTENTION

In any case, one thing is certain: the *premeditation* of the demonstrations. They were conceived long before the convening of the trilateral conference on Cyprus.

This became clear in the light of the statements made by Turkish Prime Minister Menderes on August 25, 1955 at a press conference in Constantinople, when he spoke seriously about the “threat of massacre” that (according to rumours spread by his own government) hung over the Turks living in Cyprus.

The Prime Minister of Turkey, in his speech to the National Assembly in January 1956, also quite “officially” confirmed the willfulness of the anti-Greek speeches when trying to explain and justify these demonstrations. Forgetting about the original version of his government, according to which the speeches in Constantinople and Smyrna were nothing more than “the intrigues of the communists”, Menderes with all the solemnity befitting the head of government speaking before Parliament of his country, again began to put forward the legend of the “massacre” of the Turks, which supposedly was to take place on the island on 28 August.

According to Menderes, rumours that a “massacre” of the Turks would take place in Cyprus on August 28 had stirred up the public to such an extent that it was “natural” to face “some reaction” and expressions of “some protest.” He acknowledged that certain “efforts” had been made in this direction and that certain organizations, in particular student organisations, the National Defence Committee of Cyprus and others had *taken certain actions*.

Thus, according to the head of the Turkish government, anti-Greek protests in Constantinople and Smyrna were *prepared to protest* against the “*rumours*” (launched by the Turkish government with the intention of provoking these protests); moreover, they resorted to

anti-Greek demonstrations even when it was subsequently proved that these were only “rumours”!

V.

The circumstances under which the British decided to convene a trilateral conference in London, and subsequently and in fact carried out it, as well as the role they assigned to Turkey, make any objective observer doubt that England sincerely sought to resolve the Cyprus question. One can also doubt that her efforts were, as the British claimed, aimed at finding such a solution. The question arises, weren't they really aimed at making the solution of the problem possible?

And in fact, the only "solution" that the British were striving for was *a solution from a position of strength*. Acting in this spirit, the British government immediately after the London conference appointed the chief of the Imperial General Staff, Marshal Sir John Harding, as the new governor of Cyprus. England did not send a diplomat to her colony for negotiations, but a "*pacifier*", that is, a soldier capable of "restoring order" by force of arms.

Marshal Harding himself, before leaving London, said that he was going to "pacify" Cyprus, using the experience he gained in Kenya in the fight against May-May. In the circles of the Ministry of the Colonies, it was believed that six months were enough for him to achieve this goal. In Harding's order was given a powerful military force, and this indicated a determination to "Liquidate" the Cyprus case without wasting more time.

Of course, "officially" Marshal Harding was heading to the island of Cyprus to resume negotiations with Archbishop Makarios, the head of the Cypriot national liberation movement. The basis for these negotiations

was to serve as a draft constitution proposed by Greece at a trilateral conference in London and already rejected by the Athens government.

Negotiations between Harding and Makarios were accompanied by a very real show of power from the British side. For England, this was the last attempt to *impose* on the Cypriots its “solution” to the Cyprus question, before (in the event of a new refusal) openly proceeded to “*pacify*” the island by force of arms.

ENGLISH IN OWN NETWORKS

Everything was carefully calculated and agreed upon. But the British built their calculations without Makarios. From the very beginning, the Archbishop displayed such a spirit of moderation and reconciliation that the negotiations, in spite of everything, entered a new phase, which was by no means part of London’s intentions.

So far, the biggest obstacle to agreement has been the very purpose of the national Cypriot movement: *the right to self-determination*. The British replied to this: “Never.” To break the impasse, Makarios proposed a compromise solution: England recognizes the right of the Cypriots to self-determination in principle, and in the meantime, the parties will look for ways to finally resolve the Cyprus issue, which should happen within the time frame that will be scheduled. On these conditions, the archbishop agreed to negotiate with the British for a temporary settlement of the Cyprus question on the basis of *administrative autonomy*.

From a Greek point of view, this was seen as a big concession, so painful that Makarios was heavily

criticized both in Cyprus and Athens. And yet his compromise proposal put the British in a difficult position. The British were caught in their own nets. Indeed, they had no way of rejecting the archbishop's proposal without exposing themselves, since they themselves always proposed a "constitutional solution" to the Cyprus question and at the same time, in order to make their proposal acceptable to the Cypriots, declared that this decision was temporary. character, being only a stage on the path of the final resolution of the issue, that is, the unification of Cyprus with Greece.

That is why Harding was forced to recognize in principle the right of Cypriots to self-determination, while at the same time making the exercise of this right dependent on conditions of strategic and political order, or at the complete discretion of England.

From now on, negotiations between the governor and the archbishop were centred around these two issues: the determination of the period after which the right to self-determination, and the nature of the "constitutional solution" mapped out by the British government. And finally, as a result of a new substantial concession on the part of Makarios, negotiations were carried out on the second issue, since the position of the British showed that any discussion on the first point was useless.

“CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION” MADE IN ENGLAND¹

It soon became clear that the “constitutional solution” (as the British adopted it) was no different from the formula proposed by the British government to the Cypriots seventy years ago!

This proposal was first made in 1892. By an ordinance of November 30, the Legislative Council that was supposed to represent the population of the island.

However, the procedure for the formation of this council was so original that the representatives of the overwhelming majority of the population—the Greeks—constituted a minority in it. Formally, the majority of the council consisted of elective deputies—twelve people, of whom one fourth were Turks (the ratio between Greeks and Turks was 3:1). But, in addition to these deputies, six seats were filled by the appointment of the governor.

These latter, together with the three Turks, deprived the Greeks of the majority of votes, for, in accordance with the provisions of the governor’s ordinance, in the event of a split of votes (9 to 9), the vote of the chairman of the Legislative Council was decisive. And he, of course, was an Englishman.

In 1925, when Cyprus became a crown colony, the British generously agreed to make “improvements” to the “constitutional” statute of the island, increasing the number of elected deputies from 12 to 15. But at the same time, the number of deputies appointed by the governor was also increased by three places. Thus, in

¹ Made in England.

the presence of three Turkish deputies, the votes were again divided equally (12 to 12), and the decisive vote of the English chairman, as before, turned the Greek majority into a minority.

In 1948, the British governor seemed intent on taking a big step forward in order to satisfy the demands of the Cypriots, who were already raising the question of applying to them the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

This time London solemnly offered them a “draft constitution”, which, however, differed so little from the colonial statute in force on the island (in particular, as regards the main issue-the formation of a parliament in proportion to the Greek majority) that this draft was rejected by the Cypriots...

But that did not stop the British from returning to the same project in July 1954. The British Government again proposed it to the Cypriots as a “constitutional solution” to the question. And this time, the answer, of course, was no, for the “administrative autonomy” offered to the Cypriots continued to be a fiction, and the parliamentary mechanism, which had been in effect since 1892 and reduced the Greek majority to a minority position, did not undergo any changes.

The “constitutional solution” re-proposed by England is almost indistinguishable from the decisions rejected Cypriots in the past.

TURKISH OBSTACLE

Continuing to act in the same spirit, the British supported the Turks more and more. Taking advantage of services of the Turks to stop the discussion of the

issue of the accession of Cyprus to Greece, *the British use them now to prevent the possibility of a truly constitutional solution to the Cyprus question*, despite the fact that before they pretended to agree with such a solution.

On January 1, 1956, in his New Year message, Governor Harding stated that any solution to the Cyprus question must be approved by Turkey. This meant that there can be no solution acceptable to the Greeks, since the Turks were against any changes to the status quo of the island. But the governor went even further. The United Kingdom, he said, cannot waive the responsibility that is entrusted to it in Cyprus, for this would have disastrous consequences for the local population and for the Greek-Turkish relations.¹ Indeed, the British wanted to convince that if they left Cyprus, there would be a massacre of the Turkish population of the island. As if in Greece itself there is no Turkish minority living in peace and tranquillity!

In Cyprus, this manoeuvre was expressed in intensified attempts to *create an atmosphere of civil war*.

The very next day after the events in Constantinople and Smyrna, London reported on the creation in Cyprus the underground Turkish organisation Volkan, whose purpose, as noted in its first proclamation of 9 September 1955, was to fight the “terror” of EOKA, the underground Greek resistance organisation. It was all the more strange (and, of course, exposed the true intentions of the inspirers of this organisation) that the

¹ Well, how not to admire the touching care of the British about the Greek-Turkish relations, after they inflicted a fatal blow on them with anti-Greek demonstrations in Constantinople and Smyrna!

“terrorist” actions of the EOKA were directed only against the British, and the Turkish Cypriots never had grounds for complaints².

On January 11, 1956, the British managed to achieve this. their desired real Greek-Turkish incident: a Turkish policeman was killed in Paphos. But, firstly, the Greek policemen and “collaborators” also had to pay with their lives for the provision of services to the British administration. On the other hand, the Turkish policeman in question was distinguished by a particular zeal in persecuting Greek patriots: in recognition of his merits in this type of activity, he had just received the Colonial Police Medal. Finally, there was no evidence that the killers were indeed EOKA members and that this was not the case. There were no provocations¹. Nevertheless, this incident was used in every possible way, presenting it as an act of aggression directed against the Turkish community. This served as the signal for violent anti-Greek demonstrations in the main cities of the island. With the condescending attitude of the

² From the very first days of its existence (April 1955) EOKA (the rocking letters of the Greek name for the secret organization of liberation-the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) made special appeals to the Turks of the island to assure them that it was not plotting any hostile actions, and 'make them understand that her only and exclusive enemy is the British colonial administration, against which she fought, pursuing only one goal-"to rid the island of the vile colonial regime and exploitation."

¹ In a release a few days later, EOKA described the killing of a Turkish policeman as a provocative act the British authorities, seeking to incite the Turks against the Greeks, and reminded the Turkish population that the patriots of Cyprus, who are fighting for the freedom of their country, do not harbour any hostile feelings towards them.

police and British troops², crowd with exclamations: “Revenge!”, “We demand blood!”, “Cyprus is Turkish!”- attacked and trampled shops and dwellings belonging to the Greeks.

² But according to a correspondent for the Labour Daily Herald, the police and British troops did not even try to intervene. We also note that since then the British “forces of order” have invariably taken the position of “ignorance” during anti-Greek speeches and demonstrations, which took place more and more often.

In correspondence from Nicosia in the Times (March 22, 1956) regarding one of such demonstrations, it was said about such a juicy detail: “It is a fact that the Turkish demonstrators enthusiastically welcomed the British troops and the police!”

VI.

The fate of the negotiations between the British and Cypriots was decided in January 1956 during Sir John Harding's trip to London. As it became clear later, the main features of the English plan adopted during this trip were as follows: the Cypriots will be made "new proposals" for a "constitutional solution" of the Cyprus question, but in fact these "new offers": will not contain anything new. If the proposals are accepted, England will win the party, if they are rejected, they will declare that the negotiations have finally failed, and will begin to carry out even more severe repression in order to "pacify" the island, that is, to suppress by force the liberation movement of the people of Cyprus.

Thus, the "new proposals" of the British were nothing more than a farce and an *alibi*. They were supposed to serve as "proof" of England's "goodwill", her readiness to negotiate and thereby remove from her any responsibility for the new crisis to which the Cyprus question was deliberately led.

A FARCE WITH "NEW PROPOSALS"

These suggestions were made in a letter from Governor Harding to Makarios dated January 28 in the form of a "*declaration*", to which the archbishop was also to respond with a declaration, the text of which was attached. The people of Cyprus were invited to "take part in the constitutional development" of the island.

What was it really about? There was no 'specification on this point. Declaration of English government raised issues of self-determination and administrative autonomy in a very *evasive and ambiguous* manner. The declaration dealt with the question of self-determination only indirectly, without accepting any obligations. She limited to bringing the "thesis" of the British government, according to which the application of the "principle of self-determination" to Cyprus is not excluded, since the British government put its signature under the Charter of the United Nations, the Potomac and the Pacific Charters.

It is easy to see one feature: the British government did not undertake any positive obligations, even hypothetical or conditional. It is simply set out a "thesis" which, in turn, was devoid of any positive character. It did not speak out for the right to self-determination, even in principle and even in the distant future; it only made it clear that it could not oppose the right to self-determination, because England has put its signature on international instruments that recognize this right.

Conversely, the British government's declaration contained very clear provisions regarding the application of the principle of self-determination. This right, the declaration said, cannot be exercised at the present time "in view of the current situation in the region of the Middle East." This meant that England not only rejected any possibility of applying the principle of self-determination in the near future, but at the same time refused to assume any obligations on this issue in the future.

As for the question of administrative autonomy, the British Government was more generous: it offered the

Cypriots a “*greater degree*” (wide measure) of self-government. But in what form and under what conditions?

“If the people of Cyprus,” said the Declaration, “wish to participate in constitutional development, Her Majesty’s Government *intends to seek* a solution for meeting the aspirations of the people of Cyprus”.

It is not difficult to see the care shown by the drafters of this document—a true masterpiece of ambiguity—so as not in any way to bind the British government with a promise. This government *did not even promise* to find a solution to the Cyprus issue. It only expressed its “*intention*” to “*seek*” such a solution.

Finally, the Cypriots were not asked to discuss or even simply adopt a specific draft constitution. They had to agree to take part in the “development” of a regime as vague as it was dubious, of which they had not the slightest idea, since the declaration of the British government did not contain any explanations on this score.

“OFFERS”—ULTIMATUM

But that’s not all. As if fearing to go too far, the British heeled their “concessions” with all kinds of reservations and conditions that made them even more illusory.

The “final solution” which the British government “intended to seek” was, on top of everything else, “compatible with the strategic interests” of England and her allies, and in accordance with the treaties in force by Her Majesty’s government.

In addition, the British government will be “ready to consider” with the representatives of the Cypriot population the question of the future of the island only when the *autonomy* system (self-government) proves its “ability to ensure the interests of all parts of the population.” In other words, the British made everything dependent not only on the strategic interests of England and its allies (read: Turkey), but also on the behaviour of the Turkish minority in Cyprus.

This was the whole point of the manoeuvre with the “*Turkish obstacle*”. To put forward as a condition for the settlement of the Cyprus question the approval of Turkey and the Turkish the minority of the island, which was an obedient instrument in the hands of the governments of Ankara and London, meant in advance to exclude any possibility of resolving this issue. In all likelihood, the Turkish government would not consider any solution to the issue “compatible” with Turkey’s strategic interests, just as the Turkish minority in Cyprus would never express satisfaction with the progress made as a result of the self-government granted to the island.

But there was also another point: the English proposals did not involve any discussion. In a letter to Makarios, to which was attached the declaration of the British government, Harding made it clear that it was necessary to either accept or refuse them. The British government, the governor emphasised, gives Makarios the opportunity to “express consent,” but it considers it “nevertheless necessary” that the “basis” of the agreement should be the text of the draft declaration of the archbishop, attached to the letter of the governor. So speech in fact, it was about “proposals” that were

rather in the nature of an “*ultimatum*”¹ and which could not be discussed.

And Harding told Makarios about this bluntly. Even if the latter thought that “something” in the governor’s letter and in the declaration of the British government required “clarification”, the author of the letter (Harding) was not “in a position to amend” the declaration. Moreover, the governor went even further. In the same letter to Makarios, he repeatedly repeated that the archbishop is free if he furthermore wishes to reserve his opinion on the English sentences. But in this case, he had to “take into account the *serious consequences* that could occur as a result of a possible failure” of the negotiations. The British not only refused to discuss their proposals, but also resorted to direct threats.

DRAMA MAKARIOS

Makarios was invited to “consider in all seriousness” these particular proposals as “a basis for cooperation with the aim of establishing a constitutional government in Cyprus.” Makarios (06 this he said later) was fully aware of the situation; he understood that the British had no intention of negotiating, and even less eager to come to any agreement. The archbishop understood that the British put forward their “proposals” in such a form as to make negotiations impossible and to exclude any possibility of an agreement.

¹ “Hidden ultimatum”-this is how the newspaper “New York Times” of February 5, 1956 described this document.

The first questions he raised during negotiations with the governor after his return from London concerned the essence of the constitution that the English governor had planned for Cyprus. The Archbishop yielded on the issue of self-determination in order to make possible the continuation of negotiations on the basis of administrative autonomy; in this way he wanted to make sure that this was not a deception, too.

In his letter of January 28, Harding cleverly evaded an accurate answer to this question: "I must repeat that at this stage I cannot add anything to the declaration of Her Majesty's Government." And he again repeated the reservation, which was quite enough to block any negotiations and make any agreement impossible: the "details" of the constitution "were subject to discussion with representatives of the population of all parts of the empire. deadlines set by agreement."

Makarios was faced with a terrible dilemma: to accept the English proposals meant to betray his cause. people; to reject them was to play into the hands of the British. And then the archbishop said that he was inclined to discuss them. In his opinion, this gave him the opportunity to find out the intentions of the British, that is, forcing them to reveal their cards.

A HOPEFUL ATTEMPT

In his reply dated 2 February 1956 to Governor Harding's letter dated 28 January, Makarios clarified his position, revealing the vague and evasive nature of the British proposals. If, the archbishop said, guided by his "ardent desire to achieve peace on the island," he, Makarios, announced his readiness to discuss the

declaration of the British government (although it removed the main question of self-determination), then he did so only because it was about “a simple declaration” concerning the policy of England. In Cyprus. Otherwise, if it was a unilateral agreement, he would never have put his own. signature under this document.

Makarios gave the British an answer that was the only one possible in the given conditions. Since the British did not offer the Cypriots anything specific, except for a *declaration of good intentions*, the archbishop informed them that there could be no question of adopting such a declaration: it should have been discussed in order to clarify the intentions of the British and find out what the “*essence*” of *self-government* is and what are ... the precise limits of the “broad autonomy” offered by England.

In a letter to the governor, Makarios reminded him that he was not even able to define the “basic principles” of the constitution that the British government was going to grant to Cyprus. According to Makarios, in order for the Cypriot participation in the drafting of the constitution, which they were offered, to be effective, it is necessary that “the English side should confirm from the very beginning that this constitution guarantees the establishment of a statute *true self-government*”. The Archbishop believed that the English should outline the provisions of this statute.

In essence, it was a hopeless attempt to avoid a breakdown in negotiations and to preserve the chances of a solution to the issue in the future. It was a hopeless attempt, for it was doomed to failure.

The British were as little inclined to debate their “proposals” as to clothe them in a more definite and

unambiguous form. And this was precisely because the English sentences were made not in order to become the subject of genuine negotiations with the aim of finding a solution to the issue, but in order to force the Cypriots to either accept them without changes, or declare their inadmissibility.

VII.

Harding responded to Makarios on February 14. The second letter from the governor is the most revealing and difficult document for the British in the entire “dossier on the Cyprus case.”

It left no longer any doubts about the intentions of the British: England recognized only such a solution to the Cyprus question, which she sought to impose on the Cypriots, and systematically led the whole matter to the breakdown of the negotiations.

This was all the more monstrous because in his letter the governor sought to prove that the constitution proposed by England was “democratic” and “liberal” and that the Cypriots would have done wrong to reject it.

This constitution, according to the governor, would allow the people of Cyprus “to assume responsibility through the Cypriot ministers and through a gradual development to take control of all ministries, with the exception of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence”, as well as the Ministry of Public Security, which will remain under the control of the governor “*as long as he deems necessary.*”

The real merits of the constitution, which the British were going to bestow on the Cypriots, can be judged by the way it dealt with the question of parliamentary representation. Oddly enough (and this is enough to get an idea of the nature of the constitution), this question remained open. The Times newspaper did not hesitate to assert that it was necessary to decide whether there

would be a Greek majority in the parliament of Cyprus or not¹!

In fact, this question was not even raised. For the British, it had already been decided: there would be no Greek majority in parliament. With the same cynical frankness, this was emphasised by The Times, which also took care of the appropriate justification. If there is a Greek majority, the newspaper wrote, it will probably immediately or very soon decide that the autonomous government has made sufficient progress in securing the rights of various communities, and will demand that the final decision be put up for discussion.¹ “The main body of the City of London hastened to reassure The British government, the newspaper wrote in the front line, will not provide a solution to this question to such an assembly.

It was an open recognition that the autonomy granted to Cyprus will have, in the words of the same “Times”, certain “limits”, and all this for in order to exclude any possibility of resolving the issue of self-determination by constitutional means.

¹ Times, February 3, 1956.

¹ A correspondent for the Observer newspaper (19 February 1956) in Nicosia explained the reasons for the British concern about the prospect of a Greek dominance in parliament: if, he said, an election were held, the governor could face with Archbishop Makarios, acting in a new role as chairman of the Council of Ministers and re-raising the issue of “self-determination.”

CHALLENGE WITH “CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION”

But let us take a closer look at this notorious “constitution”, about which the British made so much noise. In a very “democratic” constitution, this provided for the establishment of a parliament, the majority of whose deputies would be elected. However, this did not mean at all that this majority would be a *de facto* majority of the people, for it was envisaged that the parliament would also have a certain number of deputies *appointed* by the governor. And, according to careful calculations, the number of the appointed MPs, together with the Turkish MPs, could constitute a *de facto* majority of the parliament.

The British, apparently, remained true to their old draft constitution, which they tried three times over half a century to “make happy” the people of Cyprus. As before, in this project by combining the elected and appointed deputies violated the basic principles of parliamentarism; Greek majority Cyprus was deprived of the opportunity to have proportional representation in parliament in accordance with its meaning and, moreover, had to obey the laws established by the Turkish minority and the English the government. That is why this project has always been rejected by the Cypriots.

It might have seemed incredible. But the British, seeking to make their proposals unacceptable to

Cypriots, crossed all sorts of borders. The draft constitution also provided for the possibility of appointing a representative of the *non-Greek population* as the chairman of the Council of Ministers!

It was about the head of the government—a "Cypriot", which meant that he could also be a Turkish Cypriot.

In any case, the parliamentary majority would not enjoy the freedom to appoint the chairman of the Council of Ministers of their choice. He would be appointed only with the approval of the governor, although it was not specified whether the governor's refusal to approve the candidacy amounted to a veto.

These were the "broad perspectives" (the expression of Marshal Harding), which the British government had in mind. And all this, again, was made dependent on the consent of the Turks. Her Majesty's government, the Governor concluded in conclusion that "could not undertake the obligations "with regard to interested communities", without discussion with representatives of these communities, that is, representatives of the Turkish minority.

It only remains to add that the timing of the implementation of the English proposals was also made dependent on "to what extent the broad strata of the population and their leaders"—including the leaders of the organisation "*Cyprus is Turk*"! will be ready to accept the responsibility entrusted to them.

NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT POSSIBLE

It is easy to explain the position of Makarios, faced with this monstrous jumble of guile and hypocrisy—Governor Harding's second letter. In his In a new reply to Harding, dated February 25, Makarios had no choice but to state that the British government continues to evade, avoiding the clarifications requested by the

Archbishop in his letter of February 2. As for the “essence of the general principles of the constitution”, then, as Makarios noted, “many important issues” remained “unclear.” In particular, it was not specified that the representation in the chamber would be “In proportion to the composition of the population,” that is, that the elected majority will also constitute a de facto majority. There was also no guarantee that the Governor’s approval of the election of the Prime Minister will only be a purely formal issue.

In conclusion, Makarios emphasized that, guided by the desire that the island “in an atmosphere of calm pass the period preceding the application of the principle of self-determination,” he, the archbishop, made all possible concessions and that his conscience and national dignity of HHCTBO did not allow him to make big concessions.

This was the answer of a national leader who is aware of his responsibility and understands well the game of the British. This was the answer of a leader who could not make big concessions without betraying the cause of his people.¹

¹ To what extent the archbishop's behaviour was justified, and his suspicion was justified, can be seen from how the British systematically evaded the question of a parliamentary majority. On February 17, 1956, speaking in Chicago to American journalists, Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd said the Greek Cypriots were not yet “ripe” for *self-government*. The minister thus confirmed that the self-government so solemnly offered by England was a hoax. On March 13, in the House of Commons, Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd left two questions unanswered by Labour Griffiths, a former Colonial Secretary, demanding that the government explicitly declare, recognizes whether it is the right of Cyprus to self-determination or at least to *self-government*.

VIII.

The final stage of the English manoeuvre began with a lightning-fast visit to Cyprus by the Minister of the Colonies (February 26, 1956). According to a statement made on the matter by Lennox-Boyd in the House of Commons On March 5, he embarked on this trip with the good intention of making sure on the spot that the English side had done everything possible to reach an “honourable agreement”. In reality, it was a gesture designed for an external effect. It was made with the aim of presenting England in a favourable light as a party driven by a “sincere desire” to achieve a result, while others feverishly led the way to break the negotiations.

After they failed to impose on Makarios the London version of the “constitutional solution” of the issue, the negotiations were deprived of any meaning for the British, if not to say that they were trying to justify the need for the use of force by the fact of their break.

“OBLIGATIONS” OF MR LENNOX-BOYD

The new British representative did not bring anything into the negotiations that could get them off the ground, where they were stuck due to their

The British-and this was obvious-were determined to prevent the Greek Cypriots from having a de facto majority of 8 in parliament, provided for by the constitution they were being offered. This constitution was so “democratic” and so “liberal” that in its concern for respecting the rights of the Turkish minority, it completely overlooked the rights of the Greek majority.

stubborn (and very revelatory) of Harding's refusal to define the nature and limits of the administrative autonomy that England offered to the Cypriots.

In a statement¹ made to Makarios on February 29 on behalf of his government, Lennox-Boyd listed the "commitments" he was going to make. For his part, he demanded from the archbishop assurances of his intention to cooperate in the implementation of the constitution, which the archbishop would recommend to his compatriots to accept.

Regarding the issues raised by the Archbishop in his letter to the Governor dated February 25 regarding the intentions of the British government regarding the constitution, the Minister of the Colonies considered that the "best way" was to "repeat personally" to his interlocutor from Cyprus the "thesis" of Her Majesty's Government on this matter. as set out by Governor Harding in his letter dated 14 February. In other words, Makarios was once again referred to the English declaration of January 28 and to the "explanations" given by the governor on this matter and which he, Makarios, had already rejected due to their uncertainty and unsatisfactory.

The statement of the British Minister of the Colonies also did not introduce any clarifications on the most important question of the composition of the Cyprus Parliament and its prerogatives. "The Constitution," said Lennox-Boyd, "provided for the existence of an elected majority in the House and would protect the

¹ This document, as well as the letters exchanged between Harding and Makarios, was published by the British government in the form of a White Paper as ... proof of his "goodwill".

interests of all parts of the population. “ And that was all.

Thus, the obligations that the Minister of Colonies agreed to undertake boiled down to the following: he offered the Cypriots the same constitution that their religious and political leader has already rejected due to its ambiguity and ambiguity. Under these conditions, negotiations between Lennox Boyd and Makarios had no better chance of success than negotiations between Makarios and Governor Harding.

THE LATEST FIND OF THE MINISTRY OF THE COLONY

There was only one “innovation” associated with the trip to Cyprus of the Minister of Colonies: the minister announced the intention of the British government to send a “constitutional commissioner” to the island, who, after consultations with representatives of “all shades of public opinion on the island,” is the same Turkish minority!—will begin to work out a “liberal and democratic” constitution. This was the last find of the “cunning” from the Ministry of Colonies. With the help of this find, they thought to bypass (without touching upon) the question of the parliamentary majority, which. made the constitution proposed by England unacceptable to Cypriots. The new character (a kind of *Deus ex machina*) was left to resolve this issue on his own responsibility, without discussion and irrevocably. Only in this matter were the British very precise. As emphasized Lennox-Boyd, in his statement to Makarios, would have been the “constitutional commissioner” to

determine the “exact composition.” an elected majority.

According to the intention of those who came up with this “find”, the authority of the “specialist” on constitutional issues (and this was all the “deceit”) should have been removed from Commissioner any suspicions of adherence to British interests and to guarantee the Cypriots “liberal and a democratic “constitution, which will supposedly be worked out under his auspices. This is what I wanted tell Lennox-Boyd when he emphasized in his statement to Makarios that the “constitutional commissioner” would make their decisions “in accordance with the usual liberal constitutional concepts.”

BREAKING OFF NEGOTIATIONS

Were the British so naive as to actually believe that the Cypriots, after the farce with the “new proposals” of the British government, would take seriously this ridiculous story with the “constitutional commissioner”? Maybe. In any case, they continued to play a double game: if the operation succeeded, they would impose a “constitution” on the Cypriots, which would leave the colonial the statute of the island is unchanged; if the Cypriots reject the gift of England, the latter will have the right to abandon “peaceful methods” in order to achieve the same results by force—to preserve its rule over Cyprus.

Since Archbishop Makarios this time also showed no desire to be fooled by Her Majesty’s Minister of the Colonies, the British government officially announced on

March 5 that the negotiations between the British and by the Cypriots interrupted.

In a statement made on the same day in the House of Commons regarding negotiations with Makarios, the British minister of the colonies tried to present the matter in such a way as to present the archbishop as the culprit in the failure of these negotiations. He claimed that Makarios, in his letter to Governor Harding on February 2, accepted the English proposals, and for this reason he, Lennox Boyd, decided himself go to Cyprus. However, later, in a letter to the governor dated February 26, the archbishop allegedly returned to these resolved issues and began to raise objections that concerned only the “form” of the constitution proposed by the British government.

It is difficult to find an example of a more unceremonious handling of facts. Lennox-Boyd had to personally admit in the same statement that no agreement had been reached because, he said, three “main issues” remained unresolved all along: amnesty, oversight of public safety, and an *elected majority* in parliament.

On the other hand, Reuters, reporting on March 5 about the official breakdown of negotiations with the Cypriots, emphasized that it was not possible to agree on “basic issues”, including the question of the parliamentary majority, which determined the entire course of the negotiations.¹ The Minister of Colonies himself explained why no agreement could be reached

¹ To confuse the cards, the British tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to prove that the failure of the negotiations was connected with the issue of amnesty for the “terrorists” convicted by the British authorities, since Makarios insisted on this.

on this issue. In a March 5 statement, referring repeatedly to the issue of the Turkish minority and referring to the contacts he had with the leaders of this minority during his trip to Cyprus, Lennox-Boyd acknowledged that the British had promised the Turks that they would be represented in the future parliament. Cyprus on an equal footing with the Greeks.

A STATEMENT OF ENGLISH HYPOCRISY

Archbishop Makarios publicly exposed English hypocrisy at a press conference he hosted on March 5, the same day Lennox-Boyd presented to the House of Commons his version of the failure of the British-Cypriot talks. But Makarios said the negotiations showed that the British side showed “no desire to find a basis for a reasonable agreement.”

As for the Cypriots, they made every possible concession to facilitate the achievement of such an agreement. They, as noted by Makarios, did not demand anything other than “a simple assurance that the autonomous government proposed by the British would be democratic in nature.” This was all the more justified since the true character of this government was “properly revealed by the fact that the British did not only refused to give assurances that representatives of the majority of the population would constitute the majority in the House, but also insisted on keeping the governor for the time he deemed necessary, all powers in the field of public safety “.

“In the course of the discussion,” the archbishop continued, “we clearly realized that from the English point of view, ensuring public safety included not only

the leadership of the police, but also the exercise of all the prerogatives of the legislative and executive branches.”

Thus, “the Cypriots were asked to approve a regime that questioned their right to control parliament, and the sovereign colonial power could constantly interfere in all matters under the pretext of protecting public safety.”

However, the archbishop noted, such a regime, *“unacceptable even for a low-civilized people,”* would be *“a mockery even for a transitional period”*. The archbishop exposed the farce with the “constitutional commissar” in clear and precise terms that reveal the essence of the issue.

“The British,” he said, “disguised their insistence and their intentions with the help of vague expressions, justifying this by the fact that they could not tie the hands of the constitutional legislator who would be sent to Cyprus and who, in their opinion, should, when drawing up the constitution of the island, enjoy absolute freedom, while the role of the population was reduced to purely advisory functions. “ Moreover, neither for who was not a secret that the commissar would be an Englishman and that, consequently, he would act as “an instrument of English politics.”

In conclusion, explaining his position, Makarios said that in these conditions he was forced to declare to the British that the desire to restore peace in the country could in no way force him to betray his fundamental rights the people of Cyprus and abandon the demands for a democratic transitional government pending the application of the principle of self-determination, which continues to be the goal of the Cypriot struggle.

IX.

The meaning of the British government's decision to break off negotiations with the Cypriots was revealed by Lennox-Boyd in his March 5 statement to the House of Commons. "At the present time," said the Minister of Colonies, "our task, and moreover the main one, will be to restore order and law in Cyprus. We have everything we need for this, and we will be able to do it"¹.

On the same day, Marshal Harding announced on Radio Nicosia: "The terrorists must be eliminated" and announced his intention to continue the campaign "to restore order" by all means at his disposal.

This is not to say that England has only now made a choice in favour of a decision with the help of force, for her true goal has always been this. ("The English government," wrote the liberal newspaper *The Manchester Guardian* on May 16, "is guided by one idea: to force, always to force.") This government sought to resolve the issue by force, but in such a way that no one could hold it accountable.

¹ 1 Speaking frankly, British policy in Cyprus is nothing more than a demonstration in the spirit of the colonialism of the eighteenth century in order to create the impression that the process of the collapse of the empire has been suspended.

Using the "example" of Cyprus, England is going to demonstrate its determination not to give in any more when it comes to "protecting its legitimate and vital interests," as Prime Minister Eden said, speaking in June 1956 at the congress of the Conservative Party in Northwich. This demonstration was, however, as useless as it was untimely. Yuna coincided with another, in its own way "symbolic" demonstration organized by Nasser to celebrate the departure of the last British soldier from Egypt, in the presence of General Sir Brian Robertson, the commander-in-chief of the British forces at the base in Suez.

Finally it got its way: the British government played a comedy of negotiations to be able to claim that it had “exhausted all possibilities” in its efforts to achieve a “peaceful solution” to the Cyprus question, and to shift all responsibility for the failure of the negotiations to the Cypriots.

EXPULSION OF MAKARIOS

The expulsion of Makarios was an integral part of this policy¹. In this way, first of all, the only enemy with whom the British considered it possible to negotiate was eliminated, and practically all bridges were burned².

Secondly, this “confirmed”, so to speak, the responsibility of the Cypriots for the failure and break of the negotiations. Hence all the slander and lies that were brought down on the archbishop in order to present him as an “extremist”, inspirer and instigator of “terrorists” from EOKA³.

¹ In this regard, we quote an excerpt from a speech delivered by Labour MP Greenwood on June 9, 1956 in Workington:

“When Hungary or Poland imprison archbishops, we justly protest,” he said. “But when Great Britain arrests and expels a Cypriot archbishop, it claims that by doing so it protects the strategic interests of democracy.”

² The same was the case with the execution of two Cypriot patriots Kaaolik and Dimitriou, Lennox Boyd, on May 14, 1956, boasted in the House of Commons that he personally advised the Queen not to reckon with the petitions coming from all sides in defence of two condemned to death. Cypriots.

³ Makarios realized what awaited him when the British, immediately after the break in the negotiations, began to accuse him of joining EOKA. “Now I have to wait for new measures to be

But what could one reproach Makarios with, who was sent into exile? Nothing concrete and definite was offered to him. What London pompously called “new proposals” was actually a simple declaration of intent-vague, dishonest, ambiguous and therefore requiring clarification and clarification. Therefore, in practice, the negotiations were aimed at clarifying the intentions of the British government on this issue. And if they failed, it was not at all because of Makarios’ refusal to accept the British “proposals,” but because the British stubbornly refused to give the necessary explanations and clarify the relevant provisions in order to make it possible to open sincere negotiations on a valid draft solution to the Cyprus question, which has precisely defined content and well-defined contours.

Makarios would be perfectly right if from the very beginning he refused any discussion on the basis proposed by the British. But, as the British press itself was forced to admit, the archbishop showed sincerity and goodwill¹ nevertheless agreeing to negotiations precisely in order to force the British to clarify their intentions and make possible genuine negotiations in the hope of achieving something for a peaceful settlement (even temporary) Cyprus question.

The issue of responsibility has been resolved by an irrevocably irrevocable fact that the British will never be able to refute, namely: the failure of the negotiations is explained not by Makarios’s “intransigence”, who demanded recognition of the right

taken against me personally,” he said in an interview with the Times of Cypress on March 7, 1956.

¹ Manchester Guardian, 15 March 1956.

to self-determination for the Cypriots, but by England's refusal to grant Cyprus administrative autonomy².

All this is so obvious that after the expulsion of the archbishop, the British regarded any idea of resuming negotiations as something completely unthinkable.

On April 7, Gov. Harding said he would never support the resumption of talks with Makarios. It is not difficult to understand the governor. After all, he and his bosses in London have made so much effort to break the negotiations! When Labour MP Griffiths asked the government to agree to the Archbishop's visit to London on May 14 in the House of Commons debate on Cyprus, the proposal was greeted with *laughter and booing* on the government benches. From the point of view of these gallant Tories, only a naive person could think that Her Majesty's government would be disposed to start all over again, after it had already achieved its goal of breaking negotiations.

If, having closed the doors to negotiations, the British government, as the Labour party¹, found itself in the "vicious circle" of the policy of repression (first to restore "order", so that later resume negotiations), then it did it deliberately, with intent.

Indeed, in this way all negotiations were ruled out and the way was cleared for the use of a policy of force. And after "order" is restored, there will be no point in continuing the discussion. When Cyprus was calm, the British used this as an argument, allegedly confirming

² Lennox-Boyd completely misrepresented the truth when he argued in a May 14 statement to the House of Commons that the differences between the British and Makarios were about the application of a right of self-determination, not which the British government had in principle recognized.

¹ New Statesman & Nashin, May 2, 1956.

the need to keep the status quo of the island unchanged. The Cypriots, they said, were content with their lot and with the English administration.

“Order” was broken only after England won the “Battle of Cyprus” at the United Nations in December 1954, when it became clear to the Cypriots that they had no hope of a peaceful resolution of their national question. EOKA, as we have seen, entered the arena in April 1955.

CONFESSION

But that’s not all. The fact is that the British government never seriously considered the possibility of leaving the island. His position on Cyprus was invariably determined by considerations of imperial politics.

Just days after the break in the negotiations, Governor Harding told The Daily Express (23 March 1956) that British policy towards Cyprus in the future would take into account the following, in order of importance, factors;

- a) political and strategic interests of Great Britain¹;
- b) the desire to maintain good relations between the British and the Turks²;

¹ The strategic argument served only as a pretext for maintaining British rule on the island. Bevan, speaking on May 27, 1956 in Newcastle, said that England could get everything from the Cypriots if it recognized their right to self-determination.

But, as another Labour leader, Gaitskell, rightly remarked in his speech in Manchester on June 10, 1956, in the course of negotiations with Makarios, the question of military bases was never raised by the British.

c) the aspirations of the Cypriots.

This indicated not only that the aspirations of the Cypriots were to be taken into account in the very last place, but also that in fact England had not the slightest intention of reckoning with them and was even less disposed to satisfy them. It was the most cynical admission in this whole negotiating comedy. With the gross frankness of a colonial soldier, Marshal Harding tore off the mask under which the British government tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to hide the true nature of its policy in Cyprus.

These statements by the governor explained the future as much as the past. The first two factors, which Harding prioritized in order of importance, were put forward as sine qua non during the negotiations with Makarios and were the real reason for the failure of the negotiations. That is why there could be no question of a change in the position of England, in justification of which they referred to the very fact of the failure of the negotiations or to the “irreconcilability” of Makarios.

“NEW PRINCIPLES”

Harding’s confession expressed British politics so faithfully that it was repeated in an even more cynical

² The question of the Turkish minority in Cyprus was another pretext used by the British to prevent any solution to the Cyprus question. Proof of this is the fact that this issue was never the subject of negotiations with Makarios on the basis of respect and guarantee of the rights of the Turkish population of the island, that is, as the problem of national minorities is regulated in those countries where it exists.

manner by the Colonial Minister himself. Speaking to the House of Commons on May 14, Lennox-Boyd said that Cyprus, due to its geographic location, is “extremely important to the United Kingdom, and therefore Her Majesty’s Government will not be able to allow consideration of the issue of a change in sovereignty.”

The Daily Telegraph (May 2, 1956), referring to this issue, wrote about the “new principle” of British policy, according to which her political and strategic interests prevail over all other considerations, principles and rights, even those which England fondly recognised and pledged to respect when signing the Charter of the United Nations. And this government body was setting out a strange doctrine, something like “dosed freedom”: he made a clear distinction between what he called “a *little freedom*”, represented by areas that are of vital strategic, economic and political importance for England, and the so-called “a *great freedom*”, for which England is fighting, but which cannot be invoked in cases of restriction of freedom¹.

¹ This explains the indifferent and dispassionate attitude of England to the indignation of the world community, which rebelled against British policy in Cyprus.

For the same reason, the British administration of the island does not hesitate to use openly Hitler’s methods (of which the whipping of children, mass arrests and internment of “suspicious” ones, destruction of houses in which supposedly, “terrorists” were hiding, and collective sanctions) to “restore order”, that is, to break the resistance of the people of Cyprus.

Tribunals in Cyprus are sentencing to death for simple encroachment on the lives of British soldiers. One of Her Majesty’s judges substantiated this verdict on June 12, 1956 in connection with the case of a patriot suspected of shooting English pilots: “It is true that none of the pilots was wounded. But we owe this not to

For his part, Prime Minister Eden, speaking on June 1 before the congress of the Conservative Party in Northwich, also referred to this principle, especially emphasising the presence of England's "*oil* interests in the Near and Middle East"¹.

your good intentions, but to the fact that the bullets did not reach their target. That is why I am sentencing you to death by hanging."

¹ Note that at the same time the British government, was going to give a net for the sale of an American oil company of shares of the British "Trinidad Oil", which developed oil-bearing lands in the Antilles, which were the most important oil developments that England had within its colonial territories. But the funniest thing is how the British government explained its decision: it turns out that this deal was beneficial to the population of the Antilles, and to disagree with it meant to show a "colonial" spirit.

It is important to note that the British themselves did not take all these arguments seriously. The most influential Conservative weekly Spectator wrote openly on June 7, 1956: "Our base in Cyprus is nothing more than a bluff."

As the chairman of the Labour Party Gaitskell justly noted, speaking on June 10, 1956 in Manchester, it is not clear against what and against whom England will defend the oil of the Near and Middle East, because, as he said, if the frontier in which oil is produced (in this case-Iraq), refuse to conclude an agreement with England, the question arises: how will she send troops there?

The validity of this remark is evident from the fact that when the British were driven out of Abadan, the possession of a huge base in Suez did nothing to help them.

SUSPICIOUS DESIRE

Finally, “the desire to preserve the good relations that exist between the British and the Turks,” which, according to. According to Harding, the British government put alongside its strategic interests, preferring them to the aspirations of the people of Cyprus, and also confirmed England’s determination to never reckon with these aspirations - fortunately, there were the Turks, who could serve as an insurmountable obstacle to any change in the status quo of Cyprus!

The friendly relations between England and Turkey have nothing to do with the systematic attempts of the British to revive the Turks against the Greeks. “Cyprus is a gun put to the breast of Turkey,” wrote the Daily Mail on May 11, 1956, and concluded from this that Turkey would not allow the island to go to Greece.

On March 26, 1956, The Times presented the case as if the disagreement over the Cyprus question was one of the episodes in the age-old struggle between Greeks and Turks. In a letter addressed to the Sunday Times (March 25, 1956), former Governor of Cyprus Richmond Palmer seriously argued that the idea of uniting Cyprus with Greece implies the destruction of Turkey and, therefore, could lead to war between Turkey and Greece.

The threat of such a war was the leitmotif of this entire incitement campaign.

At a meeting of the House of Commons on May 14, 1956, the national liberal MacLay announced that Turkey would start a war against Greece if Cyprus was granted the right to self-determination; his speech was greeted with a “burst of applause” from the government majority. According to a Conservative

weekly,¹ the applause meant that the Turks would then do the right thing to fight the Greeks.

The anti-Greek demonstrations on September 6, 1955 in Constantinople and Smyrna showed the scale and danger of the British manoeuvre, calculated to use Turkey and the Cypriot Turks¹ against Greece in order to block the solution of the Cyprus issue. Subsequently, this manoeuvre began to be carried out in Cyprus itself,² where the provocative acts of the Turks, supported and inspired by the British authorities³, took on the character of real aggression against the Greeks. This aggression had a pronounced tendency to turn the conflict into civil war, which would be the limit of the wishes of the British⁴.

¹ Spectator, May 18, 1956. "When asked about Cyprus, the conservatives turned into Turks," the magazine wrote about this.

¹ The Times noted on 29 May 1956 that until very recently the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus lived in harmony side by side and that this agreement had only recently been broken.

² On the part of the Greek majority, there have never been any acts of provocation, or anti-Turkish speeches or demonstrations. And the fact that the Turks "dared" to provoke riots and attack the Greeks, although they were a minority everywhere and, therefore, it would seem, should have been afraid of the consequences of such actions, clearly enough indicates that they are in collusion with the British authorities.

³ The height of hypocrisy: On May 29, Governor Harding appealed to the Greek and Turkish population of Cyprus with a call to restore peaceful relations among themselves!

⁴ It is important to note in this regard that not a single MP and not a single Labour newspaper in their criticism and in their speeches against the policy of the Conservative government in Cyprus has never exposed this diabolical manoeuvre. On the contrary, they speak in all seriousness about the "rivalry" between the Cypriot Greeks and the Turks as something deserving of regret, but in

The Times revealed the perpetrators of these bloody events, expressing the hope that these incidents *will show the extremists from Athens and Ankara* (in fact, this concerned, of course, only the Greeks) *what their intransigence can lead to.*

which the British authorities in Cyprus have absolutely no involvement.

In this respect, the speech of Nyurin Beven is very characteristic. In his speech in Newcastle on May 27, 1956, the leader of the left wing of the labour Party categorically stated that there could be no question of Britain's withdrawal from Cyprus. It would be "monstrous", he said, to leave the Cypriots in a state of anarchy, for this would "inevitably" lead to a conflict between Greeks and Turks!

Let us also quote the speech of Labour MP Reginald Paget at a meeting of the House of Commons on May 14, 1956. He proposed to seize the property of the Cypriots, evict them to Greece and replace them with new Turkish colonists whenever any Greek village refuses to help the British troops solve the "crimes" committed by the EOKA "terrorists". In other words, he proposed many new Oradurs!

X.

If the British government had been even a little sincere, if it had even the slightest desire to achieve a peaceful and genuine constitutional solution to the question of Cyprus, it would not have broken off the negotiations from the very beginning¹ and would not have done everything possible afterwards; to prevent their renewal. On the contrary, it would try to put the negotiations on a *new basis*, barking the chances of reaching a solution acceptable to the Cypriots, that is, a solution that would not be a *hoax*.

Only under this condition will British policy in Cyprus cease to be “absurd and cruel confusion”².

Even the Daily Telegraph, the organ of the Conservative Party, came to the conclusion that a change in policy was necessary.

“The time has come,” the newspaper wrote on June 7, 1956, “when England must repeat (*but this time clearly and definitely*) what she understands by *self-government* for Cyprus, and prove on the facts that a liberal constitution is being prepared.”

Note, by the way, that this statement testifies to the fact that all the statements that the British have made on this matter so far have been vague, vague and devoid of any positive meaning.

The labour Party has outlined such a programme. But Labour believes that the proposed constitution for

¹ On March 14, in the House of Commons, the vice-chairman of the labour Party, Griffiths, directly accused the British government of having thwarted the negotiations without sufficient justification.

² 2 Spectator, June 1, 1956.

the Cypriots should provide them with effective administrative autonomy and recognise the right to self-determination in a timely manner, while protecting the rights and security of the Turkish minority.

This policy change became necessary because; that all the assumptions and all the calculations of the British government have in fact proved to be untenable.

So, marching with an “iron fist” argued that EOKA’s activities relied on a “small group” of people, hardly more than a dozen, and that the number of armed “terrorists” did not exceed a hundred¹. This was convenient for confirming Britain’s arguments that the “terrorists” do not represent the bulk of the population of Cyprus. However, these statements only made England ridiculous, for this handful of people showed staunch resistance to 17 thousand English soldiers who could not “restore order.”

THE HOPES OF THE BRITISH

The British actually recognized that their policy of force and repression in Cyprus had failed and that the chances of improving the situation in the future were small. However, the position taken by them during negotiations with the Greek government, and then with Archbishop Makarios, It excluded the possibility of a real change in their policy and their making sincere proposals for a fair settlement of the Cyprus issue. Instead of “reviewing “their policy, they continue to insist on a “constitutional solution”, which was already the subject of failed negotiations with Makarios.

¹ Reuters communication, May 26, 1956.

Thus, England hopes to get out of the Cyprus impasse without affecting the status quo of the island, that is, without satisfying the aspirations of the Cypriots to any extent. The resumption of negotiations would mean for her only a new attempt (this time more dexterous and insidious²) to force the Cypriots to agree to a “constitutional solution”, which they have already rejected.¹

In this respect, there can be no doubts or illusions. These “new proposals”, which were discussed during Governor Harding’s trip to London (June 1955) and which were supposed to serve as a basis for subsequent negotiations, were in fact an exact reproduction of the proposals made by Makarios.

² The insidiousness consisted in the fact that the order of the arrangement of the “concessions” made by the British was changed: the recognition of the right of Cypriots to self-determination was highlighted and even the date was set when it would be applied, although all this, of course, was surrounded by reservations and conditions.

This, according to the British, would force the Cypriots to accept the “constitutional decision” rejected by Makarios, which in turn would make it even more problematic for the Cypriots to exercise their right to self-determination.

¹ In addition, the resumption of negotiations would allow England to avoid a new discussion of the Cyprus issue in the UN. Hence the efforts made by the British government to give these negotiations a tripartite character-modelled on the Anglo-Greek-Turkish conference in August-September 1955, by involving the leadership of Turkey in these negotiations.

As then, actions were agreed between London and Ankara; everything was repeated to the details. In particular, the Turkish government renewed threats to prevent by force of arms the accession of Cyprus to Greece and the “efforts” of England, again acting as “arbiter”.

The government press itself was quick to stress that nothing had changed. "Big changes in English policy are not expected," wrote a diplomatic correspondent for the semi-official Daily Telegraph.

June 7, 1956. "No change in the foundations of English politics," the Sunday Times said on June 17. And the author of the leading Times newspaper (June 22) did not hesitate to put his feet on the table, claiming that it was not so much about a "new policy" as about "a new way of applying the old policy." This was so true that on this occasion it was reported in London that the Supreme Court Justice Lord Radcliffe would soon leave for the island of Cyprus as "Constitutional commissioner". The British government still held on to this unrealistic project, proposed by Lennox-Boyd to Makarios during his trip to Cyprus in February 1956, to impose a "pre-fabricated constitution" on the people of Cyprus.

This stubbornness and optimism of the British is based on the belief that "now" (as the Times diplomatic correspondent emphasized on June 19, 1956) there is a chance that the Cypriots will accept the points on which the negotiations with Makarios failed.

The British, who are counting on Washington's "good offices" in this matter, are hoping for a split in the internal front of the Cypriots and Greeks and for the isolation of the para-troops fighting with arms in hand; this, in particular, was one of their main goals when they demanded that the archbishop condemn the EOKA "terrorists".

At the end of the horses, England's only hope is to bring new people to Cyprus or Athens to negotiate with, people who are inclined to let themselves be drawn into this "constitutional decision" venture. As it is

understood in London, this “constitutional decision” amounts in reality to the “renewal” of the existing colonial statute of Cyprus and to the perpetuation of British rule.

Governor Harding wrote in a letter dated 17 February 1956 to Archbishop Makarios:

“Her Majesty’s Government is of the opinion that its position on this [Cypriot] issue must be brought to the attention of public opinion without delay, so that both here [in Cyprus] and abroad can judge the efforts made by her Government majesties to reach an agreement.”

It is with the aim of giving an idea of public opinion that this brochure is written.

E. Dzelepi

THE TRUTH ABOUT CYPRUS

*Technical Editor N. I. Smirnova
Proofreader E. B. Markson*

Put into production 13'X-1957

Signed for printing 12;/[I—1958

*Paper 84ZH108 1|p=1 boom. l. 3.3 gtx. l.
Uch. - ed. l. 2,9. Ed. No. 71/4001,*

Price 1 p. 10 K. Zak. 104.

PUBLISHING HOUSE OF FOREIGN LITERATURE

*Moscow, Novo-Alekseevskaya, 52.
Moscow, Stankevich str., 7. Type. "Gudok".*